(Eric Cahna - Imagn Images)
From the moment the Boston Celtics attempted 61 three-point attempts in a season-opening 132-109 victory over the New York Knicks, NBA fans and pundits have been scrutinizing the volume of three-point attempts, some going as far as calling it an epidemic. People have suggested that the dramatic increase in three-point shooting over the last 10-15 years – teams are averaging 37.5 three-point attempts per game this season compared to 20 per game in 2012-13 – has made the game considerably less entertaining. As a result, people have devised rule changes aimed at reducing the amount of threes taken, reversing the effects of the analytically driven three-point revolution.
If the league is going to make drastic changes to curb the rise in three-point attempts, it is important that we fully understand the cause of the revolution and the effects of the changes. Analytics has been blamed for a plethora of complaints across multiple sports, including three-point volume. The premise is that computer models illustrated the value of shooting more layups and threes at the expense of the mid-range shot, but a dramatic rise in three-point shots was inevitable; we were going to figure out that three is more than two eventually.
There is no denying that analytics played a large role in the three-point revolution, the Houston Rockets were the poster-franchise for this trend under analytically-driven general manager, Daryl Morey, but there is another culprit: talent. In 2023-24, 58% of NBA players who attempted at least 25 three point attempts shot at least 35% from three. That number was 52% in 2012-13 and 48% in 2002-03. The amount of players shooting threes has increased, and their success rate has increased as well. Players were not practicing their three-point shot the way they are now. Even kids with no chance at playing in the NBA can shoot lights out from three because those are the shots that they are taking the second they walk onto a court. Kids are not using a computer model to tell them to shoot threes in practice; they understand that three is more than two and are able to hit them at a high rate.
Removing the corner three has been the most widely discussed rule change. The league would extned the three point line so that it intersects the sideline at the wing, as shown in the image below.
The rest of this article focuses on this proposed rule change. There are many similarities between eliminating the corner three and Major League Baseball restricting the shift. Many people point to the success of the new MLB rules as evidence that the NBA needs to intervene, but it is also a cautionary tale. Several rule changes significantly improved the game of baseball, such as the pitch clock, limiting pitcher and batter disengagements, and making the bases bigger, but restricting the shift is not one of them.
Over the past decade, league-wide batting average has dropped as a result of hitters emphasizing the home run at the expense of base hits. The chart below shows how hitting has changed over the past decade.
Year | Shift %* | AVG | BB% | K% | HR% | Pull% | LA |
2016 | 13.6% | .255 | 8.2% | 21.1% | 3.39% | 39.7% | 11.6˚ |
2022 | 33.6% | .243 | 7.9% | 22.5% | 3.19% | 40.5% | 12.7˚ |
2024 | 24.8% | .243 | 7.9% | 22.6% | 3.33% | 38.7% | 13.3˚ |
*2016 and 2022 show the percentage of plate appearances where the infield was shifted (3 or more infielders on one side of the field). 2024 shows the percentage of plate appearances where the infield was shaded (outside typical position) since teams need two players on each side of the infield. (baseballsavant.com)
The chart shows that teams shifted significantly more in 2022 than in 2016, and it decreased once the league started restricting the shift. Unsurprisingly, the league-wide batting average was lower in 2022 than in 2016 as shift percentage rose, but average did not increase again once the shift was restricted. Also, BB%, K%, and HR% have seen slight changes, but nothing drastic since 2016. Neither has Pull%.
There is a commonly held belief that batters adjusted their approach to beat the shift, pulling the ball more with a higher launch angle, which resulted in a lower batting average and more walks, strikeouts, and home runs. However, this is not really the case. Hiiters did not adjust to the defense, the defense adjusted to hitters. Launch angle has increased slightly, but it continued to increase after the shift was regulated because hitters were not trying to beat the shift, they were trying to hit the ball in the air because that is how you become a valuable hitter. People said that the best way to beat the shift was to hit the ball over the fence, but the best way to beat any defensive alignment is to hit the ball over the fence.
Another big factor in the decrease in batting average is talent. Just as shooting talent has increased the volume of three point shots, pitching talent has made it more difficult for hitters to put the ball in play, decreasing league-wide batting averages. Pitching has gotten so much better over the past decade with every bullpen having multiple relievers with fastballs in the upper 90s and massive movement on their breaking balls. In addition, the way bullpen management has changed, with starting pitchers being removed earlier and more relievers being used, has made it more difficult to hit. Batters have more success against a pitcher the more they see them, but now starters are often getting pulled before facing the batting order for a third time. Batters today also face more pitchers in a season than batters in the past. For instance, White Sox first baseman, Andrew Vaughn, faced 251 different pitchers in 2024 in his 619 plate appearances. In 1965, Dick Allen (welcome to the Hall of Fame!!) faced 108 different pitchers in his 619 plate appearances.
So what was the purpose of this long aside about baseball in an article about basketball? MLB fans and pundits identified the lack of action as one of the problems facing the league. They concluded that the shift changed hitters’ approaches at the plate, so restricting the shift would revert the game back to a time when batting average and putting the ball in play was more valued, thus making the game more entertaining. However, the shift was not the cause of this transformation, so all the rule did was limit the defensive strategies available to teams while doing nothing to add more action to at-bats.
MLB is lucky that the result of misidentifying the cause of their problem did not have monstrous consequences; minimal restrictions on the shift have not had a huge impact on baseball, but removing the corner three would have a drastic impact on NBA basketball.
Would removing the corner three reduce the number of three pointers taken in the NBA? Absolutely. Corner threes are some of the most frequent shots in basketball. But the volume of three-point shots is not the problem, the type of shots is the problem, and removing the corner three will just exacerbate it.
Action is what makes sports entertaining. The NBA’s current problem is how many possessions end with quick threes off of minimal ball and player movement. This includes stepbacks early in the shot clock, pull-up threes in transition instead of going to the rim, and four players standing at the three point line watching their teammate dribble the air out of the ball before taking a contested three. The video below, which has ten million views on Twitter, shows exactly that. It is a glorified pickup game, and although it is a 23-point game in the fourth quarter, it illustrates why many fans have become disinterested in watching NBA basketball.
However, the problem with these shots is not that they are behind the three-point line, it is how the teams are getting them. It is not any more entertaining to watch teams shoot a bunch of pull-up 18-footers in transition; the distance from the basket does not determine the excitement. Removing the corner three would not reduce ill-advised shot attempts. It took until the 1:25 mark of the video for a player to take a corner three (a step-back airball from Gabe Vincent). If anything, these types of shots will be more common without the corner three because of what the rule would do to spacing.
Every team places offensive players in the corner behind the three-point line due to the efficiency of shots from this location, but they also space the floor, opening up driving lanes for their teammates. If the league removes the corner three, there would be no reason to place a player there, and they will likely stand in the short corner, the dunker spot, or at the elbow. Teams would be forced to clog driving lanes, which, combined with the shot-making talent of NBA players, would lead to more above-the-break threes. Teams would also be incentivized to take threes in transition before offensive and defensive players are able to get to their spots inside the arc.
Similar to how restricting the shift did not alter hitters’ approach at the plate because the home run was still the most valuable outcome to an at bat, removing the corner three would not reduce the incentive for teams and players to shoot threes because the three-point shot would still be the most valuable shot in the game. Their shot attempts will just move from the corner to above-the-break, which are more likely to be shots that bore NBA fans. If the league is going to install a monumental change to the game, it should alleviate the problem, not amplify it.
Commentaires